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Abstract
[Excerpt] There is vociferous opposition to employers forcing pre-dispute arbitration agreements on
employees. Critics argue that employees are not voluntary participants in the process, which they say unfairly
favors employers. Advocates of mandatory arbitration dispute these charges and argue that arbitration offers
employees and employers significant advantages over litigation. For example, they argue, among other things,
that that litigation is not as accessible as arbitration because lawyers will not take low value employment cases
on a contingency basis.
Critics of mandatory employment arbitration have moved the debate into the legislative arena. Bills have been
introduced in state legislatures and in Congress that would, if enacted, substantially change the current
arbitration system. For example, the proposed “2009 Arbitration Fairness Act” would amend the FAA to
largely overturn Gilmer and Circuit City by expressly invalidating mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
agreements imposed on employees and consumers, and allowing only voluntarily signed, post-dispute
arbitration agreements for these classes of claimants.
Empirical research has an important role to play in this debate. By shedding light on how employer-
promulgated arbitration systems operate, researchers can inform the discussion of public policy and legislative
decision making. This column will look at some recent empirical research to see what it can tell us about the
current system of employment arbitration and then identify areas in need of additional research.
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Employment Arbitration: Empirical
Findings and Research Needs 
Some 18 years ago the SupremeCourt’s Gilmer decision1 usheredin the modern era in employment
arbitration. The subsequent Circuit
City case2 decided by the Supreme
Court interpreted the employment
exclusion in Section 1 of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) in a manner that
made the FAA apply to most employ-
ment arbitration agreements, including
those imposed on employees by em-
ployers as a condition of employment.
As a result of these decisions, the use of
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
agreements has grown significantly.3
Based on a survey I conducted in 2003
of 291 nonunion workplaces, I found
that 22.7% of nonunion employees
were covered by employer-promulgat-
ed arbitration agreements. A more
recent survey conducted in 2007 by
Prof. David Lewin of UCLA found
that of 757 nonunion businesses, 354
or 46.8% had promulgated employ-
ment arbitration programs.4
There is vociferous opposition to
employers forcing pre-dispute arbi-
tration agreements on employees.
Critics argue that employees are not
voluntary participants in the process,
which they say unfairly favors em-
ployers.5 Advocates of mandatory
arbitration dispute these charges and
argue that arbitration offers employ-
ees and employers significant advan-
tages over litigation. For example,
they argue, among other things, that
that litigation is not as accessible as
arbitration because lawyers will not
take low value employment cases on a
contingency basis.6
Critics of mandatory employment
arbitration have moved the debate
into the legislative arena. Bills have
been introduced in state legislatures
and in Congress that would, if enact-
ed, substantially change the current
arbitration system. For example, the
proposed “2009 Arbitration Fairness
Act”7 would amend the FAA to large-
ly overturn Gilmer and Circuit City by
expressly invalidating mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration agreements im-
posed on employees and consumers,
and allowing only voluntarily signed,
post-dispute arbitration agreements
for these classes of claimants.
Empirical research has an impor-
tant role to play in this debate. By
shedding light on how employer-pro-
mulgated arbitration systems operate,
researchers can inform the discussion
of public policy and legislative deci-
sion making. This column will look at
some recent empirical research to see
what it can tell us about the current
system of employment arbitration
and then identify areas in need of
additional research.
Early Research Results
One problem for researchers has
been the dearth of publicly available
data on which to conduct empirical
research that would help evaluate the
arguments of both sides of the em-
ployment arbitration debate. There is
no government agency that collects
statistics on the number of employees
covered by employer-promulgated ar-
bitration programs or the outcomes
of arbitration cases filed under these
programs. What research has been
done is based on data made available to
individual researchers by arbitration
service providers, most notably the
American Arbitration Association
(AAA) and the Financial Industry Reg-
ulatory Authority (FINRA). For exam-
ple, the AAA made available to Eliz-
abeth Hill data on its employment
cases decided in 1999-2000. She and
Prof. Theodore Eisenberg analyzed
the data and published their report in
the Dispute Resolution Journal in
November 2003.8
This data included cases decided
under both employer-promulgated
and individually negotiated agree-
ments, which they analyzed separate-
ly. One of the variables they studied
was the time it takes to resolve em-
ployment cases in arbitration, a met-
ric commonly used to evaluate the
claim that arbitration is faster and
more efficient than litigation.
They divided the AAA cases into
two categories, one involving civil
rights claims and the other non-civil
rights claims. They found that out of
172 non-civil rights cases resulting in
an award, the average (mean) time to
issuance of an award was 270 days. In
the 42 civil rights cases that went to
an award, the average time to disposi-
tion was 276 days. They compared
this with reported federal court data
from 1999-2000 and state court data
from 1996. This data showed that the
average time to trial of 170 non-civil
rights cases in state was 723 days. For
the 163 civil rights cases in state court,
the average disposition time was 709
days, and for the 1,430 civil rights
cases in federal court, it was 818 days.
The comparison showed that arbi-
tration was indeed faster than litiga-
tion for both civil rights and non-civil
rights cases.
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More Recent Research
Fortunately, more data on arbitra-
tion cases under employer-promul-
gated plans has become public due to
California’s enactment of a law that
requires private arbitration service
providers to report certain informa-
tion about employment, consumer
and certain other kinds of cases they
administer nationally.9 I used data the
AAA reported in compliance with this
statute to conduct a study of employ-
ment arbitration involving employer-
promulgated arbitration agreements.10
The AAA report showed that there
were 2,763 employment cases reach-
ing disposition11 between Jan. 1,
2003, and Sept. 30, 2006, of which
836 went to award.
One of the variables my study ex-
amined was the time between filing
the demand to issuance of an award
following a hearing. My study found
that the average time to an award was
332 days. This finding compared fa-
vorably with the two-three years it
takes to reach disposition by trial,
according to the litigation data
Eisenberg and Hill used and other
studies of employment litigation. Thus
it appears that arbitration remains a
faster process than litigation for ob-
taining a hearing, perhaps on average
one to two years faster.12
Areas for Further Research
Most cases are resolved by settle-
ment, whether they are in litigation
or arbitration. The earlier a case set-
tles, the shorter the process, which
would tend to shorten the time to
resolution for both systems. Another
thing that shortens resolution time in
both systems is an arbitral or court
order granting a dispositive pre-hear-
ing or pre-trial motion, such as one
for summary judgment in favor of the
employer or the employee. No study
that I know of has compared the time
in arbitration and litigation from fil-
ing to settlement or to granting a
summary disposition motion. Nor has
any study examined the time from fil-
ing an arbitration demand through a
motion to vacate an award (the denial
of which could also be appealed).
Clearly, challenging the enforcement
of an award would lengthen the arbi-
tration process. Appeals also lengthen
the litigation process. Research indi-
cates that appeals from trial judg-
ments are common in employment
litigation.13
Empirical research is needed to
assess the impact that settlements,
summary dispositions and appeals
have on arbitration cases and then
compare them to litigation.
Another area needing empirical
research is whether arbitration proce-
dures include due process protec-
tions.14 There is also a question of
how well commonly accepted due
process standards, for example the
Employment Due Process Protocol,15
developed in the 1990s by representa-
tives of leading organizations in-
volved in employment law and arbi-
tration, are being enforced.
The AAA, which participated on
the task force that created the Due
Process Protocol, applies the protocol
to employer-promulgated arbitration
cases it administers. According to the
introduction to the AAA Employ-
ment Arbitration Rules, if the AAA
finds that a program “on its face sub-
stantially and materially deviates”
from the minimum due process stan-
dards in the AAA rules and the Due
Process Protocol, “the Association
may decline to administer cases under
that program.”16
Established arbitration service
providers, like the AAA, offer advan-
tages from a due process perspective.
One is that they have well-established
rules that incorporate minimum due
process protections and provide some
basis for accountability if the arbitra-
tor does not enforce them.
To date, the best and only evi-
dence on enforcement of due process
standards by arbitration service pro-
viders is the research on consumer
arbitration conducted by the Searle
Institute under the leadership of Prof.
Christopher Drahozal.17 Searle’s pre-
liminary report concluded that the
AAA is effectively enforcing due
process protections in its consumer
arbitration procedures.
On a much more limited level, I
looked at one aspect of due process in
my 2006 study of AAA employment
arbitration cases—whether the AAA
was complying with its own rule re-
quiring employers to assume the bur-
den of all fees (apart from a small fil-
ing fee) in arbitration cases under
employer-promulgated arbitration
programs. I found general compliance
with this rule. However, there is no
substitute for a full-scale study of the
enforcement of due process standards
in employment arbitration generally
on the level of the Searle Institute’s
study. In my view, if confidence in
the due process of employment arbi-
tration is to be enhanced, it is impor-
tant that arbitration service providers
follow the lead of the AAA in provid-
ing academic researchers with access
to their data.
The picture of due process in ad
hoc arbitration is an unknown. These
cases have no arbitration service pro-
vider and no established rules to pro-
vide employees with procedural due
process. These cases may never see
the light of day unless the employee
challenges the award in court (as in
the notorious Hooters case18). As a
result, obtaining data to research
what is happening in these cases will
continue to be a challenge.
Another area for empirical research
is the outcomes of arbitrations under
employer-promulgated arbitration
agreements and how they compare to
outcomes of litigation. Some early
studies found relatively similar out-
comes in litigation and arbitration.
For example, Delikat and Kleiner
found employee win rates and average
awards of damages in cases adminis-
tered under the securities industry
arbitration rules to be similar to the
outcomes in cases litigated in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York.19
Although an interesting study, it
involved a distinguishable population
since employees in the securities
industry tend to be relatively highly
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paid and work under contracts and
rules particular to that industry.
Eisenberg and Hill also examined
the question of arbitration and litiga-
tion outcomes in their 2003 study.
They reported similar employee win
rates for litigation and employment
arbitration cases involving individual-
ly negotiated agreements, but lower
employee win rates in arbitration cases
involving employer-promulgated
plans. They assumed that claimants
under individually negotiated agree-
ments were higher-paid and that
claimants under employer-promul-
gated agreements were lower paid.
Eisenberg and Hill did not have ac-
cess to the salary levels of the arbitra-
tion claimants involved in their study.
In my view their assumption seems
reasonable because of the type of
cases involved.
It is likely that there are substantial
differences between cases involving
individually negotiated and employer-
promulgated agreements. Eisenberg
and Hill found when they examined
the area of damages awarded. There
were 44 non-civil rights arbitrations
involving individually negotiated con-
tracts. The median or typical20 award
was $94,984 and the average (mean)
award was $211,720.
There were 26 arbitrations based on
employer-promulgated agreements.
The typical and average awards in
these proceedings were much lower:
the typical award was $13,450 while
the average award was $38,723.
Eisenberg and Hill’s study also
found higher typical and average jury
awards in favor of non-civil rights
plaintiffs in state court cases. Using
data from 79 cases, they found that the
typical award was $68,737 and the
average award was $462,307.
Eisenberg and Hill did the same
type of analysis for civil rights based
cases. For two arbitrations involving
individually negotiated agreements the
typical and award were both $32,500.
For six civil rights arbitrations based on
employer-promulgated plans, the me-
dian award was $56,096 and the mean
award was $259,795.
However, given that Eisenberg and
Hill had only 26 cases under employer
plans and only eight civil rights arbitra-
tion cases in their data (compared with
a much larger sample of state and fed-
eral court cases involving employment
discrimination claims21), we should not
over-interpret their results.
My 2006 study was not so limited,
thanks to the California-required dis-
closures imposed on private arbitra-
tion providers. I had data on 836 AAA
cases involving employer-promulgat-
ed arbitration agreements that result-
ed in an award. This allowed me to
analyze win rates and arbitral awards.
I classified an employee win as any
case in which some amount of dam-
ages greater than zero was awarded to
the employees.
My analysis showed an average em-
ployee win rate of just 19.7%. This is
substantially lower than the employee
win rates found by Eisenberg and Hill
using a much smaller sample. This
result is also substantially lower than
the win rates they reported in litiga-
tion and those reported by other
researchers in more recent studies of
litigation.22
Eisenberg and Hill noted in their
analysis that looking at win rates alone
may not tell the whole story because
outcomes may not reveal whether a
claimant “truly succeeded.” Thus, the
win rate is only a starting point in the
analysis. To obtain a fuller picture,
the analysis needs to include other
data, such as the amount of damages
claimed versus the amount awarded
and, if possible, the degree of partici-
pant satisfaction with the dispute reso-
lution process.
My analysis of awards in the 836
arbitrations indicated that damages
were awarded to employees in 165
cases. The typical award was $40,624
and the average award was $117,715.
This is substantially less than the typi-
cal and average damages awarded to
court litigants in the civil rights and
non-civil rights cases analyzed by
Eisenberg and Hill. Unfortunately, the
reports required under California law
do not require arbitration providers to
identify whether the cases involved
civil rights or non-civil rights claims,
so I was not able to break down the
analysis by these categories.
To obtain a statistic to compare the
average expected arbitration outcomes
in arbitration and litigation (taking
account of both the chance of winning
and the average damages likely if the
employee wins), I calculated the aver-
age award in the 836 arbitration cases
used in my study, and the average
damages awarded in the litigation
cases used by Eisenberg and Hill in
their study, including those where
zero damages were awarded. Since the
state court cases were from 1996, and
the federal court cases were from
1999-2000, I adjusted them for infla-
tion using 2005 dollars.
The average expected award for
the arbitration cases was $23,233.
The average expected damages award-
ed in the non-civil rights cases litigat-
ed in state court was $261,666
($325,707 in inflation-adjusted 2005
dollars23). The average expected dam-
ages awarded in the employment dis-
crimination cases were as follows: (1)
$209,578 ($260,871 in 2005 dollars)
for the cases litigated in state court,
and (2) $122,410 ($143,497 in 2005
dollars) for the  cases litigated in fed-
eral court.
Using the inflation-adjusted litiga-
tion figures for the purposes of com-
parison with arbitration, I found that
the average expected award in the em-
ployment arbitrations was: 7.1% of the
average expected outcome in the state
court non-civil rights cases; 8.9% of
the average expected outcome in the
employment discrimination cases liti-
gated in state court; and 16.2% of the
the average expected outcome in the
employment discrimination cases liti-
gated in federal court.24 Although liti-
gation and arbitration win rates and
damage award could vary over time
and it is not clear how much state ver-
sus federal court outcomes should be
weighted in the analysis because we do
not know the reason for the different
state and federal court results, the
(Continued on page 11)
11D I S P U T E  R E S O L U T I O N  J O U R N A L
ADRnews
overall picture shows a large gap in the
average expected outcomes in arbitra-
tion and litigation.
We do not know what factors may
explain this result. The next task is to
identify what these factors are and
how much they contribute to out-
comes in arbitration and litigation.
(The kind of research that is needed
is similar to the investigation into the
cause of the male-female wage gap,
which resulted in women earning
about 80% of what men earn for full-
time work.25) I suggest three possible
areas for future research.
The first area concerns the distrib-
ution of types of claims and claimants
in arbitration and litigation. Eisen-
berg and Hill took some steps in this
direction by separating out non-civil
rights from employment discrimina-
tion cases and arbitration cases
involving individually negotiated
agreements from cases involving
employer-promulgated plans. Future
researchers could gather more de-
tailed information on case character-
istics in both employment arbitration
and litigation, including information
on who the plaintiffs are in employ-
ment litigation. At this time, there is
no empirical data on the salaries of
employees in litigation.
Another area that could be re-
searched relates to accessibility of arbi-
tration and litigation to lower-income
employees. Advocates of employer-
promulgated arbitration plans assume
that litigation is not accessible to low-
income employees with small value
claims and that arbitration is accessible
for these employees.
Since California law requires pri-
vate arbitration providers to classify
the claimants according to certain
income levels, I was able to look at
the economic status of the claimants
in question in my 2006 study. The
data showed, on the one hand, that
77.4% of the employment arbitration
claimants earned less than $100,000 a
year, and on the other, that three quar-
ters of the claims were over $36,000,
and the typical (median) amount
claimed was over $100,000. These
claims probably would not be consid-
ered small.
Accessibility is a difficult area to
research because we only observe the
cases in which people go to arbitration
or litigation, not those who do not
access either forum. Low numbers of
cases might indicate barriers to access,
but could also indicate effective reso-
lution of problems before disputes
enter the litigation or arbitration sys-
tem. Case studies of companies that
have adopted internal grievance pro-
cedures, such as internal management
appeals boards, mediation, or peer
review,26 along with employment
arbitration suggest that they can
resolve many cases, with potential
advantages from both the employees
and the organization’s point of view.27
If internal grievance procedures are
filtering out stronger claims before
arbitration, it would mean that the
employee win rate is lower than it
otherwise would be.28 This is an area
worth further examination. 
My early research found a signifi-
cantly greater likelihood that cases
would be resolved in favor of the em-
ployee in internal grievance proce-
dures where these procedures were
adopted with employment arbitration
as a later step in the procedure.29 This
strongly suggests that we should not
view arbitration in isolation, but in
conjunction with the internal conflict
management systems adopted by or-
ganizations.
Another area that should be exam-
ined is whether there are decision-
maker effects. Do employment arbi-
trators, judges or juries tend to favor
employers over employees or vice
versa? Research conducted by Klaas,
Mahony and Wheeler found that
employment arbitrators (particularly
those with management backgrounds)
ruled in favor of employees less often
than a comparison group of individu-
als who had served as jurors in em-
ployment litigation cases.30 This study
used a policy-capturing methodology
in which subjects were sent a ques-
tionnaire asking them to evaluate a
set of hypothetical cases. Although a
commonly used and accepted tech-
nique in social science research, at
this point in time, there is no field
research involving actual cases to
confirm this study’s results. (One
must be careful not to overstate the
authors’ conclusions. For example,
they did not conclude that  all arbitra-
tors with management backgrounds
rule in favor of employees.) Thus,
future researchers could explore
whether there is a clear relationship
between arbitral decisions and the
background or other characteristics of
the arbitrator.
Training all arbitrators in the ethi-
cal obligation to be neutral, fair, and
apply correct legal principles is vital
to the health of employment arbitra-
tion. So is the opportunity for parties
to select from a balanced roster of
neutrals who have a variety of back-
grounds and experiences.
Conclusion
Empirical research on employment
arbitration is a challenging field that
in many ways is still in its infancy.
We are still trying to answer basic
questions about the general charac-
teristics of this dispute resolution sys-
tem. For empirical researchers to do
so will require the ongoing assistance
and support of the organizations and
practitioners in this field. The AAA
has a record as a leader in improving
the arbitration process and in granti-
ng researchers access to data. Much
of the best empirical research has
come from its data. Other organiza-
tions should follow the AAA’s lead
and help develop a sound basis for
answering the many questions that
continue to be posed in this field. n
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